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Abstract The governance of civil society organizations (CSOs) is a crucial
determinant of organizational legitimacy, accountability, and performance. Inter-
national nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are a subtype of CSOs and have
received a lot of attention as actors in global governance. Research suggests that
INGOs can follow a membership model, where the board is elected by the mem-
bership, or a board-managed model, where the board is appointed to represent major
stakeholders. Following resource dependency theory, we argue that the choice
between these two models depends on the INGOs different sources of funding and
the degree of volunteer involvement: As donors and volunteers provide important
resources, they are in turn granted the right to nominate board members or to sit on
the board. In our quantitative study we show that individual members, regional
member organizations, and governmental donors hold a stronger position in the
governance of INGOs than philanthropists, foundations and volunteers. Our results
inform research on CSO governance by highlighting the relevance of board nom-
ination modes and by showing how CSOs can incorporate stakeholders into their
governance mechanisms.
Deutsch Die Governance zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen u¨bt einen ent-
scheidenden Einfluss auf deren organisationale Legitimita¨t, Accountability und
Performanz aus. Internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen (INGOs) sind ein
Subtyp zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen und haben in ihrer Funktion als
Akteure der Global Governance viel Aufmerksamkeit erhalten. Die Forschung
beschreibt zwei unterschiedliche Modelle, nach denen ihre Governance strukturiert
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sein kann: In dem sogenannten ‘‘Membership Model’’ wa¨hlen die Mitglieder der
Organisation das oberste Direktionsgremium (board) demokratisch. In dem sogen-
annten ‘‘Board-managed Model’’ hingegen werden die Mitglieder des obersten
Direktionsgremiums benannt und so zusammengestellt, dass die wichtigsten
Stakeholder repra¨sentiert sind. Unter Verwendung der Resource Dependence-
Theorie argumentieren wir, dass die Wahl zwischen diesen beiden Modellen von
den Finanzierungsquellen und dem Einbezug von Freiwilligenarbeit in der Orga-
nisation abha¨ngt: Da Geldgeber und Freiwillige wichtige Ressourcen zur Verfu¨gung
stellen, wird ihnen im Gegenzug das Recht zugestanden, Mitglieder der Direktion
zu wa¨hlen oder zu stellen. In unserer quantitativen Studie zeigen wir, dass indi-
viduelle Mitglieder, regionale Mitgliedsorganisationen und staatliche Geldgeber
eine sta¨rkere Rolle in der Governance von INGOs spielen als Philanthropen,
Stiftungen und Freiwillige. Unsere Ergebnisse leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag zur
Forschung zur Governance zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen, indem sie die
Bedeutung von Nominierungsverfahren fu¨r das oberste Direktionsgremium hervo-
rheben und aufzeigen, wie zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen Stakeholder in ihre
Governance integrieren ko¨nnen.
Keywords Civil society organizations  CSO governance 
International nongovernmental organizations  Nonprofit boards 
Resource dependency theory  Stakeholders
Introduction
The international growth and increased impact of civil society organizations (CSOs)
has been one of the dominant and most striking features of world society over the
past 20 years (Anheier and Themudo 2005; Boli 2006; Fisher 2003; Fowler 1997;
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Teegen et al. 2004). CSOs
are collective, organized actors within civil society, often also referred to as
nonprofit organizations (Teegen et al. 2004).
International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are a subtype of CSOs and
have received a lot of attention as actors in global governance (Boli 2006; Martens
2002; Salamon 2003; Vakil 1997). Their responsibility as an actor in world politics
has increased dramatically and hence the rise of global civil society has been
characterized as a ‘‘global associational revolution’’ comparable to the earlier rise of
the nation-state (Salamon 1997b). For example, as of September 2009 there were
almost 2,400 INGOs with consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations. In 1989 only approximately 900 INGOs had that status, in 1999,
10 years ago, only approximately 1,700 (Willets 2010).
This growth has been accompanied by a greater scrutiny of their performance and
accountability (Brown 2008; Brown and Moore 2001; Dichter 1989; Ossewaarde
et al. 2008). At the same time, INGOs face serious external challenges: resource
scarcity, extremely volatile and challenging environments, a multitude of
stakeholders with often diverging interests, and calls for an increased profession-
alization of the sector (Salm 1999). INGOs have answered these challenges
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collectively and individually, for example, by drafting the ‘‘International Non-
Governmental Organisations’ Accountability Charter’’ (2005) and by adapting their
global structures.
According to the widely used definition of Vakil (1997) INGOs are self-
governing, private, not-for-profit, and have an explicit social mission. There is
some discussion whether INGOs which work closely together with states or
corporations—so-called government-organized, quasi-nongovernmental, and donor-
organized INGOs—meet the criteria of being fully private and self-governing
(Gordenker and Weiss 1995; Vakil 1997). According to Boli (2006), there are
currently 6,000 to 7,000 fully transnational INGOs operating in a multitude of
countries in addition to tens of thousands of transnationally oriented NGOs which are
based in a single country but internationally active. Most INGOs are constituted as
foundations or associations under national law. Some of them have individuals as
members, some have national or regional organizations as members of the
international central office, and some do not have members (Foreman 1999).
In their complex organizational structure the design of INGO governance stands
at the core of their managing challenges. Their internal governance should provide a
mechanism to ensure legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness (Anheier 2005;
Anheier and Themudo 2005; Foreman 1999). One crucial question in this regard is
how INGOs deal with their stakeholders: Which stakeholders does the INGO not
only deem important in its missions and activities, but also within its internal
governance structures? For example, which stakeholders hold the right to vote for
board members and which stakeholders actually sit on the board?
In fact, we know little about nomination modes and stakeholder representation
within the boards of INGOs. This is an important gap in current research as INGOs,
like other CSOs, do not have one formal owner, such as the shareholders of for-
profit enterprises, but rather multiple owners such as donors and volunteers (Anheier
2005). Thus, their managers have ‘‘an almost unmatched degree of autonomy’’
(Glaeser 2003), so that these organizations require effective internal governance
mechanisms for their supervision. Indeed, we find empirically that public scandals
in the sector such as fraud, mismanagement, questionable fundraising practices,
misappropriation and misspending of funds, and corruption ‘‘point to a clear
problem of governance. Symptoms of governance failures suggested in the cases
examined include failure to supervise operations, improper delegation of authority,
neglect of assets, failure to ask the ‘‘right questions,’’ lack of oversight of the
executive director, failure to institute internal controls, absence of ‘‘checks and
balances’’ in procedures and practices, and isolation of board members from staff,
programs, and clients’’ (Gibelman and Gelman 2004).
In this context, board nomination modes and stakeholder representation
constitute a crucial aspect of effective oversight and checks and balances:
Democratically elected international boards enhance the internal accountability
and external legitimacy of INGOs (Weidenbaum 2009). They allow organizational
actors to execute so-called residual rights of control, for example, giving regional
organizations the right to influence the mission and policies of the INGO and to take
part in the oversight of executive directors. The nomination of major stakeholders
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for the board in turn allows these stakeholders to directly supervise and influence the
use of their resources.
In accordance with resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory (Freeman
1984; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Speckbacher 2008), we quantitatively test to what
extent board nomination modes depend upon different types of funding and
volunteer involvement. We examine two nomination modes: first, the nomination
mode of membership organizations, where the board is elected by the organizational
actors and members, and, second, of board-managed organizations, where the board
is appointed by the most influential external stakeholders or where the board is self-
selected or self-perpetuating (Enjolras 2009; Salamon 1997a). The choice between
the two models has large implications for the governance of INGOs and the power
of different stakeholders: In membership organizations authority and control
ultimately rests with the members of the INGO. In board-managed organizations,
governance relies much more on the integrity of the board members and on their
accountability to the various internal and external stakeholders (Enjolras 2009).
We only study INGOs based in Switzerland because the regulatory and economic
environment arguably has a strong impact on the governance of INGOs (Curbach
2003; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). In line with the current literature, we argue that
types of funding and the degree of volunteer involvement are the major
determinants of board nomination and stakeholder representation because donors
and volunteers constitute the primary stakeholders and therefore are granted residual
rights of control such as the right to elect or nominate board members. Accordingly,
we follow the research question: To what extent do board nomination modes and
stakeholder representation in international nongovernmental organizations depend
on different types of funding and volunteer involvement?
This paper is organized as follows: After a background section with a literature
review and remarks on INGOs in Switzerland, we present the theoretical frame,
methods, and empirical results of our study. In the last section we discuss our
results, outline contributions to literature and practice, and give recommendations
for further research.
Background
With some 1,000 INGOs, amongst them some of the most well-known and oldest
worldwide (about 15% of all registered INGOs), e.g., the International Committee
of the Red Cross or the World Wide Fund for Nature, Switzerland hosts a
remarkably high number of INGOs in relation to its population size according to
data from the Union of International Associations (Lee 2010; Smith and Wiest
2005; UIA 2010). Kriesi et al. (1995) find in a comparative study of Western
European countries that Switzerland has by far the highest level of social
mobilization. Nevertheless, to date no profile of the Swiss INGO sector exists.
Most INGOs—in Switzerland and elsewhere—have adopted global structures
and their internal governance aims at achieving organizational legitimacy,
accountability, and effectiveness (Foreman 1999). Arguably, the performance of
INGO or CSO boards and the design of INGO or CSO governance is an important
590 Voluntas (2011) 22:587–612
123
determinant of organizational performance (Brown 2005; Herman and Renz 2000;
Provan 1980; Siciliano 1996, 1997).
Nonetheless, the governance of INGOs arguably needs further systematic
research (Lewis 1998, 2006). In a broad review based on interviews with the leaders
of the world’s largest INGOs, Lindenberg and Dobel (1999) conclude that a
‘‘special urgency exists in the need to explore models of governance of global
NGOs’’ and this claim is still valid. The studies which deal with INGO governance
yield important insights on how INGOs are organized globally, how they deal with
their accountability and legitimacy challenges, and how they deal with their various
stakeholders (Anheier and Themudo 2005; Brown 2008; Brown and Moore 2001;
Foreman 1999; Hudson and Bielefeld 1997; Lewis 1998; Lindenberg and Bryant
2001; Lindenberg and Dobel 1999; Young 1992, 2001a, b; Young et al. 1999).
Given these important studies and the existence of various theoretical models that
deal with the governance of CSOs, the field is methodologically mature
(Edmondson and McManus 2007). Nevertheless, past research in the field is mostly
limited to qualitative, descriptive studies of different aspects of governance and
structure and only very few quantitative empirical studies are available (Andre´s-
Alonso et al. 2006; Iecovich 2005a). Quantitative studies can yield important
contributions to the field by providing an empirical overview of the sector which is
equally valuable for practitioners and researchers, testing the hypotheses gained by
the qualitative endeavors and by determining on which factors governance attributes
depend in practice.
Like other CSOs, INGOs have a governing body and an executive body in the
two-tier model (Siebart and Reichard 2004). Most Swiss INGOs are designed
according to that model and are mostly constituted as associations or foundations
(Jakob et al. 2009). Often the governing body is referred to as the advisory council,
board of trustees or the board of directors. For reasons of simplification we will refer
to it as the board in this paper. The Swiss NPO Code (2006) assigns both controlling
and strategic tasks to the board. Typical tasks are to supervise and evaluate the
executive directors, oversee program and budgetary matters, define the overall
strategy, ensure that resources are used efficiently and appropriately, measure
performance, and seek to maintain public trust (Anheier 2005; Hung 1998).
Authors agree that for INGOs ‘‘critical challenges develop from the need to
remain accountable to a diverse and dispersed membership base, which poses
crucial questions for internal democracy, accountability, effectiveness, and legit-
imacy’’ (Anheier and Themudo 2005, p. 186). This is particularly true for member-
owned INGOs, where membership-based governance is ‘‘understood to be more
democratic, more accountable, and more egalitarian, reflecting qualities within the
organization that it advocates in society’’ (Anheier and Themudo 2005, p. 189) but
also understood to be a cost- and complexity-generating feature.
Enjolras (2009) distinguishes between membership organizations and board-
managed organizations. In membership organizations the annual general meeting
of members elects a board to oversee organization management. In board-
managed organizations, board members are usually appointed by external
organizations or authorities (for example, governments) or are self-recruited and
self-perpetuating.
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The distinction between the membership organizations and the board-managed
organizations is conceptual. We do not yet know which of these models are
common in practice. As Iecovich (2005b) points out, two major theoretical
perspectives yield contrasting recommendations on how board members should be
nominated (see also Cornforth and Edwards 1999): According to the ‘‘democratic
model’’, which maintains that the major role of governing boards is to represent the
interests of various constituencies and groups, board members of INGOs should be
elected by the members. This speaks in favor of the membership model.
Democratically elected international boards are judged to enhance the internal
accountability and legitimacy of INGOs (Weidenbaum 2009) allowing members to
take part in the governance of the organization (Robinson and Shaw 2003). In
contrast, according to stewardship theory (Davis et al. 1997; Muth and Donaldson
1998), board members should be selected (i.e., by the board) or appointed (i.e., by
stakeholders or external organizations) based on their expertise, experience, and
contacts that may help the organization achieve its goals. This speaks in favor of the
board-managed model. A third model includes boards which represent national
affiliates. Here, board members can either be elected or they can sit on the board
automatically because of the organizational constitution that prescribes the inclusion
of regional representatives.
Theoretical Model
In our study, we empirically validate the concepts of the membership organization
and the board-managed organization and to what extent the implementation of these
concepts depends on sources of funding and the degree of volunteer involvement. In
accordance with resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory, we follow the
hypothesis that INGOs choose a board nomination model according to their primary
resource providers:
First, resource dependency theory views organizations as embedded in and
interdependent with their environment (Hillman et al. 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). The survival and impact of an organization depends on external resources
and the governance of an organization ensures that it acquires them. In this view, the
main function of the board is to create links to the environment, acquire financial
resources, obtain necessary information, maintain and develop good relations with
external stakeholders, help the organization respond to external change, and
enhance legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The application of this theory is
particularly fruitful since INGOs depend heavily on external funds, volunteer work,
and public support (Miller-Millesen 2003).
Second, stakeholder theory assumes that organizations are accountable to a large
set of institutions or actors (Freeman 1984). In order to ensure sustainable long-term
performance, board members need to monitor and manage these relationships and
ensure organizational responsiveness. Key roles of INGO boards are to represent
key stakeholders, facilitate negotiation, resolve potential conflicting interests, and
ensure that management acts in the interest of these stakeholders. Indeed, INGOs
can be seen as being accountable to a wide range of stakeholders and therefore a
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stakeholder perspective yields important insights. In their ‘‘Accountability Charter’’
(2005), the world’s largest and most important INGOs describe the wide range of
their stakeholders:
• ‘‘Peoples, including future generations, whose rights we seek to protect and
advance;
• Ecosystems, which cannot speak for or defend themselves;
• Our members and supporters;
• Our staff and volunteers;
• Organisations and individuals that contribute finance, goods or services;
• Partner organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, with whom we
work;
• Regulatory bodies whose agreement is required for our establishment and
operations;
• Those whose policies, programmes or behavior we wish to influence;
• The media; and
• The general public.’’
The tremendous variety of stakeholders INGOs perceive clearly indicates that it
is extremely difficult from an external but also from an internal point of view to
define which groups constitute relevant stakeholders and what role they should play
within the governance of an organization. A governance problem arises because in
INGO-long-term-relationships the use of resources cannot be specified in advance.
Internal governance then is interpreted as a mechanism that determines the position
(in particular the bargaining power) of each stakeholder (Speckbacher 2008). The
core question subsequently is: Which stakeholders should possess the residual rights
of control and hence be the primary stakeholders?
Residual rights of control entail decision-making power in situations where there
are no contractual or legal regulations, for example, when interpreting the mission
or formulating the organizational objectives and strategies (Speckbacher 2008). The
board of an INGO plays a crucial role when it comes to those functions and different
board nomination modes give different stakeholders a different number of residual
rights of control. Those people or groups who sit on the board can be regarded as
primary stakeholders, but primary stakeholders may also opt to delegate manage-
ment decision rights and control rights (Fama and Jensen 1983). In that case, those
people who elect and nominate the board members can also be regarded as primary
stakeholders. For example, members of an INGO who may elect the board clearly
hold a more powerful position in the governance of an INGO than members who do
not possess that right—even if they will not all be actual members of the board.
But how can we define which parties should be primary stakeholders to an
organization? Speckbacher (2008) builds on Cornell and Shapiro (1987), who argue
that a party is a stakeholder if that party (1) contributes specific resources,
(2) creates values for the organization (that is, the investments promote the common
objectives of the organization), and (3) has claims on the return from the investment
which are incompletely specified by contracts and hence (at least partly)
unprotected. Following that definition, donors and volunteers are the major
stakeholders of INGOs (see Fig. 1).
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Donors such as individual members, national or regional member organizations
which are part of the INGOs federal structure, philanthropists and individual donors
donating smaller amounts of money, governments, or foundations provide financial,
tangible resources. Volunteers provide non-tangible resources such as time, work,
know-how, and important contacts. Theoretically, an INGO, in turn, provides
donors and volunteers with residual rights of control such as the right to elect board
members or even a seat on the board. In fact, scholars observe a rising pressure of
(1) donors to justify the use of resources and to let them participate in the oversight
and strategic management of the INGO (Anheier and Leat 2006; Salm 1999),
and (2) volunteers that ‘‘donate’’ work time and knowledge to INGOs to be
actively involved in the governance of the INGO (Ja¨ger et al. 2008; Kreutzer and
Ja¨ger 2011).
Other stakeholders that INGOs name in their International Accountability
Charter such as ‘‘peoples, including future generations, whose rights we seek to
protect and advance; and Ecosystems, which cannot speak for or defend
themselves’’ (INGO 2005) do not contribute specific resources and do not create
value for the organization in the sense of resource dependency. Paid staff does not
meet the third requirement of this definition: Even though they contribute specific
resources and create value for the organization, their claims on the return from the
investment are indeed specified as they receive a salary for their work.
Nevertheless, from a legitimacy point of view, it is perfectly reasonable and
rational that INGOs consider these groups as stakeholders. Our argument
nonetheless is that, from a resource dependency theory point of view, these actors
and groups do not constitute primary stakeholders and therefore will not be granted
with residual rights of control by the INGO.
We follow the previously introduced distinction between the membership
organizations and the board-managed organizations. We thus hypothesize that
INGOs which finance themselves primarily through membership fees have boards
Residual rights of control 
Non-tangible resources 
(Work, time, know-how, 
important contacts) 
Tangible resources 
(Funding) 
Donors 
Volunteers 
INGO 
Residual rights of control 
Fig. 1 Theoretical model
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which are democratically elected by the members (membership model). In turn,
INGOs which finance themselves primarily through donations from government,
foundations or philanthropists are nominated to represent these stakeholders (board-
managed model). Here, the board members are either elected or appointed by the
external stakeholders or the board is self-selected or self-perpetuating. INGOs
which finance themselves primarily through contributions from regional or national
member organizations, i.e., national affiliates, have boards which represent these
organizations and are either elected by the general assembly or nominated by the
member organizations directly.
H1a INGOs which finance themselves primarily through membership fees from
individual members have boards elected democratically by a general assembly.
H1b INGOs which finance themselves primarily through donations have self-
selected boards that are nominated to represent these stakeholders.
H1c INGOs which finance themselves primarily through contributions from
regional member organizations have boards that are either elected or nominated to
represent these member organizations.
We further assume that INGOs with a large percentage of volunteers choose
different models of governance than INGOs whose work is primarily carried out by
professionals (Kreutzer 2009; Kreutzer and Ja¨ger 2011). We assume that those
volunteers ask for rights of co-determination and for democratic governance
mechanisms, thereby strengthening the membership model of INGO governance.
H2 INGOs which have a larger degree of volunteer involvement have boards
elected democratically by a general assembly.
Method
Data were obtained through a standardized electronic questionnaire. We did not use
secondary data for analysis for the following reasons: INGOs tend not to be very
transparent when it comes to issues surrounding governance. Often, annual reports
and information on board composition are not publicly available (Lloyd et al. 2008).
Therefore, the coding of publicly available sources is not an option. Neither public
registers nor other sources with a comprehensive set of data on INGOs in general
and their governance in particular exist in Switzerland.
The electronic questionnaire was sent to all 924 INGOs registered in the
Statistical Yearbook of the UIA which have their main headquarters in Switzerland.
Within this population we find a huge variety of types of INGOs, encompassing
large federations such as the International Olympic Committee, foundations such as
the Kofi Annan Foundation, advocacy associations such as the World Wide Fund for
Nature, International Relief Organizations such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, but also many smaller organizations active in very different fields.
The UIA is the quasi-official source at the United Nations for INGOs and has been
used for a large variety of studies in the field (Boli 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998;
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Lee 2010; Smith and Wiest 2005). Nevertheless, the dataset has not been used to
study governance-related questions so far.
Data collection was carried out between June and August 2010. We received 249
responses, which equates to a return rate of 27%. With respect to a number of our questions
the response rate was lower and the respective figures for n are described in our results.
Description of the Sample
Our sample reflects the large heterogeneity of the Swiss INGO Sector: Of the 249
organizations, 67% are constituted as associations, 16% as foundations, 1% as
co-operatives and 16% report having a different legal form or no regular judicial
status. Table 1 shows the percentage of INGOs being active in different fields of
activity. The organizations are active in a variety of fields, with some focusing on
education, research, and development cooperation. Some organizations report to be
active in more than one field.
The organizations were founded between 1869 and 2006 and they report being
active in a large variety of regions (see Table 2). Almost all INGOs are active in
more than one region. Most of the INGOs are active in Western Europe, but the
percentages also clearly show the large coverage of activities: Even in Oceania
every forth INGO with headquarters in Switzerland is active.
On average, they are active in 45 countries. The organizations have up to 3,000
regional and national member organizations and report representing up to 1 billion
individual members. They employ up to 600 full-time staff and enjoy the support of
up to 100,000 volunteers. Their average annual budget is 4,760,000 Swiss Francs
(3,650,000 Euro), ranging from 600 Swiss Francs (450 Euro) to more than 50
million Swiss Francs (28 million Euro).
With regard to governance, almost all INGOs in this sample have a central
governing board, executive committee or board of directors which represents the
Table 1 Fields of activity
N = 249
Field of activity Percentage
Education 28.45
Research 17.24
Development cooperation 15.95
Health care 13.36
Human rights and workers’ rights 10.78
Business 8.19
Sports 7.33
Environment or animals 6.90
Culture or art 5.17
Human services/community improvement 4.74
International emergency relief 3.88
Religion 3.88
Consumer or citizen interests 2.59
Other 23.71
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organization internationally (96%). On average, their boards have 10 members, held
3 board meetings in 2009, and are mostly comprised of outsiders, i.e., people who are
not simultaneously employed by the organization. Nevertheless, in most of the cases
the executive director or secretary general is a voting member of the board (53%).
Empirical Model and Statistical Techniques
The empirical model is summarized in Fig. 2. To test our hypothesis, we run linear
regression analysis using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS). We regressed both the
predictor variables such as funding and volunteer involvement and the controlled
Table 2 Regions of activity
N = 249
Regions of activity Percentage
Western Europe 55.82
Central Eastern Europe and Russia 43.78
Asia 40.56
Africa 38.15
South America 36.55
North America 35.74
Oceania 26.10
H2 (+) 
H1c (+) 
H1b (+) 
H1a (+) 
Primary revenue sources 
Membership fees paid by 
individual members
Donations and 
contributions from philan-
thropist, foundations or 
government
Membership fees of 
regional member 
organizations
Board nomination modes and 
stakeholder representation 
Democratically elected by 
a general assembly 
Representation of 
individual members 
Nominated by the board 
or a board committee 
Representation of 
philanthropists, 
foundations or 
government
Democratically elected or 
nominated by the regional 
organizations 
Representation of 
regional member 
organizations
Degree of volunteer involvement 
Ratio volunteers / paid 
staff
Fig. 2 Empirical model
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Table 3 Variables
Variables Definition
Nomination
mode
Elected by individual
members
Percentage of board members elected by the organization’s
individual members
Self-nomination Percentage of board members elected by the board or a
board committee
Elected by regional
member organizations
Percentage of board members elected by the regional
member organizations
Stakeholder
representation
Individual members Percentage of board members representing individual
members of the organization
Financial supporters Percentage of board members representing financial
supporters of the organization
Public sphere Percentage of board members being representatives from
the public sphere
Regional member
organizations
Percentage of board members representing regional
member organizations
Volunteers Percentage of board members representing volunteers
Funding Individual members Importance of fees and charges from individual members as
a revenue source (1: 0%; 2: 1–9%; 3: 10–24%; 4: 25–49%;
5: 50–74%; 6: 75–100%)
Donations individuals Importance of donations from individuals as a revenue
source (1: 0%; 2: 1–9%; 3: 10–24%; 4: 25–49%; 5:
50–74%; 6: 75–100%)
Foundations Importance of grants, donations or contracts from
foundations as a revenue source (1: 0%; 2: 1–9%; 3:
10–24%; 4: 25–49%; 5: 50–74%; 6: 75–100%)
Government Importance of grants, donations or contracts from
government or public agencies as a revenue source
(1: 0%; 2: 1–9%; 3: 10–24%; 4: 25–49%; 5: 50–74%;
6: 75–100%)
Regional member
organizations
Importance of fees and charges from regional organizations
as a revenue source (1: 0%; 2: 1–9%; 3: 10–24%; 4:
25–49%; 5: 50–74%; 6: 75–100%)
Volunteers Worldwide Number of volunteers worldwide
Headquarter Number of volunteers at headquarters
Control
variables
Legal form
Foundation 1: Foundation; 0: No foundation
Association 1: Association; 0: No association
Age Age of the organization
Size
Revenues Total revenues of the organization
Individual members Number individual members
Paid staff Number of paid staff
Volunteers Number of volunteers
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variables on the dependent variables within one model. That way, the significance of
our predictor variables is controlled for the variance regarding factors such as size
and field of activity.
In the questionnaire, with respect to the dependent variables, we asked the
organizations to indicate the number of board members nominated through a certain
mode such as, for example, a democratic election by the organization’s individual
members and also how many board members represented certain stakeholders such
as, for example, important donors. With regard to the independent variables, we
asked the INGOs to indicate what percentage of revenues had been generated
through different sources such as donations from foundations or membership fees.
Also, the INGOs were asked to indicate the absolute number of paid staff and
volunteers worldwide and at their headquarters. Table 3 presents all variables
included in the empirical model.
Table 3 continued
Variables Definition
Field of activity
Business 1: Active in the field of Business; 0: not active in the field
of business
Development
cooperation
1: Active in the field of development cooperation; 0: not
active in the field of development cooperation
Education 1: Active in the field of education; 0: not active in the field
of education
Environment or
animals
1: Active in the field of environment or animals; 0: not
active in the field of environment or animals
Health care 1: Active in the field of health care; 0: not active in the field
of health care
Human rights and
workers’ rights
1: Active in the field of human rights and workers’ rights;
0: not active in the field of human rights and workers’
rights
International
emergency relief
1: Active in the field of international emergency relief; 0:
not active in the field of international emergency relief
Research 1: Active in the field of research; 0: not active in the field
of research
Religion 1: Active in the field of religion; 0: not active in the field
of religion
Sports 1: Active in the field of sports; 0: not active in the field of
sports
Human services/
community
improvement
1: Active in the field of human services/community
improvement; 0: not active in the field of human
services/community improvement
Culture or art 1: Active in the field of culture or art; 0: not active in the
field of culture or art
Consumer or citizen
interests
1: Active in the field of consumer or citizen interests; 0:
not active in the field of consumer or citizen interests
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Results
Sources of Funding
We distinguish between eight major sources of funding (see Table 4) and we find
that the revenue sources differ greatly between the organizations:
The INGOs in this sample primarily fund their activities through donations from
individuals: grants, donations or contracts from foundations; grants, donations or
contracts from government; fees and charges from organizational members; fees
and charges from individual members; economic activities; and, to a lesser extent,
endowment incomes and other sources. Interestingly 17.4% of the total revenues of
INGOs in this sample are generated through economic activities. This speaks in
favor of an increasing hybridization of the sector in the sense that INGOs also
engage in economic activities to generate revenues which are then used to fund their
programs.
Our first hypothesis states that INGOs which finance themselves primarily
through membership fees from individual members have boards elected democrat-
ically by the individual members of the organization, for example through a general
assembly. Results from regression analysis show that this relationship is strong and
very significant (see Table 5). In addition, we find that in INGOs which finance
themselves primarily through membership fees paid by individual members
stakeholder representation on the board is different: The number of board members
representing the individual members is higher in such INGOs.
We control our results for legal form, age, size, and field of activity. It is not
surprising that in foundations it is less common to have boards elected through
individual members because of the smaller membership basis and that nomination
modes vary to some extent according to fields of activity. Interesting findings are
also that older INGOs have significantly less board members elected by the
individual members and that INGOs with larger revenues have more board members
elected by the individual members. Nevertheless, no general patterns can be
observed and the results are not significant when explaining stakeholder
representation.
Further, we expect that INGOs which finance themselves primarily through
donations from individuals, grants and contracts from foundations and/or grants and
Table 4 Sources of funding
N = 105
Revenues Percentage
Fees and charges from organizational members 20.63
Economic activities 17.40
Fees and charges from individual members 13.73
Grants, donations or contracts from government 12.23
Grants, donations or contracts from foundations 11.48
Donations from individuals 11.03
Endowment income 6.15
Other 7.35
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contracts from the government or public agencies will have self-selected boards.
This hypothesis is partly rejected (see Table 6).
The percentage of board members elected by the board or a board committee, i.e.,
self-nominated, as well as the stakeholder representation of financial supporters and
representatives from the public sphere only partly depends on the revenue sources.
Only government funding has a strong, significant positive impact on the
stakeholder representation. The nomination mode is not explained by sources of
funding. We again control our findings for the legal form, age, size, and field of
activity. As expected, self-nomination and the representation of financial supporters
is more common in foundations.
The last hypothesis regarding the impact of revenue sources on board
nomination and composition postulates that INGOs which primarily finance
themselves through membership fees and contributions from regional and national
member organizations have boards that are elected by a general assembly to
Table 5 Relationship between
sources of funding and board
nomination and stakeholder
representation: individual
members
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05,
*** p \ 0.001 (two-tailed)
Nomination
mode: elected
by individual
members
Stakeholder
representation:
individual
members
Funding: individual members .243** .210*
Legal form
Foundation -.248** -.016
Association .043 .075
Age -.285** -.217
Size
Revenues .331* .237
Paid staff -.226 .092
Field of activity
Business .070 -.170
Development cooperation -.152 -.042
Education .016 .003
Environment or animals -.006 .117
Health care -.080 -.017
Human rights and
workers’ rights
.142 .052
International emergency relief .189 -.137
Research -.038 .104
Religion -.233* -.261*
Sports -.206** -.036
Human services/community
improvement
.056 -.045
Culture or art .353*** .236**
Consumer or citizen interests -.073 -.264**
N 84 86
R2 .502 .261
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represent these stakeholders or elected or nominated by the regional organizations
directly.
Our data support this hypothesis (see Table 7). The correlations are strong and
very significant. INGOs which primarily finance themselves through fees and
charges from regional organizations do, in turn, give these regional organizations
residual rights of control by allowing them to vote for board members and by having
more board members representing them. We control our findings for the legal form,
age, size, and field of activity. It is not surprising that INGOs active in the field of
sports do have more often boards elected through regional members because these
organizations are typically very decentralized.
Table 6 Relationship between sources of funding and board nomination and stakeholder representation:
self-nomination
Nomination mode:
self-nomination
Stakeholder
representation:
financial supporters
Stakeholder
representation:
public sphere
Funding
Donations individuals .048 -.044 .097
Foundations -.013 -.144 .055
Government -.009 .330** .252*
Legal form
Foundation .406** .429** -.034
Association .161 .188 -.300*
Age -.019 -.120 -.019
Size
Revenues -.068 -.139 .126
Paid staff .083 .182 .116
Field of activity
Business -.218 .249 .128
Development cooperation .039 -.164 -.232
Education .101 .254* -.166
Environment or Animals -.042 .017 -.052
Health care -.073 -.061 .009
Human rights and workers’ rights .024 .145 .049
International emergency relief -.096 -.266* -.095
Research .182 .123 .032
Religion -.167 -.081 -.125
Sports .069 .108 -.078
Human services/community
improvement
-.168 .248 .029
Culture or art -.188 .110 .276**
Consumer or citizen interests .195 -.165 .008
N 84 86 86
R2 .323 .263 .275
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.001 (two-tailed)
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Volunteer Involvement
Of the 124 organizations who reported on the involvement of volunteers in their
activities, 46 have no volunteer involvement at all and 80 organizations have no
volunteer involvement at their headquarters (see Table 8). On the other hand, some
INGOs have up to 100,000 volunteers worldwide. With regard to paid staff, 39
INGOs have no paid staff worldwide and 44 INGOs have no paid staff at their
headquarters. Other INGOs in our sample have up to 1,000 paid staff worldwide
(see Table 9).
We test whether the degree of volunteer involvement has an impact on board
nomination modes and stakeholder representation on the board. Hypothesis 2 states
Table 7 Relationship between
sources of funding and board
nomination and composition:
regional member organizations
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05,
*** p \ 0.001 (two-tailed)
Nomination mode:
elected by regional
member
organizations
Stakeholder
representation:
regional
member
organizations
Funding: regional member
organizations
.310** .392**
Legal form
Foundation -.139 -.132
Association -.047 -.161
Age .225* .055
Size
Revenues .099 -.246
Paid staff -.191 .139
Field of activity
Business .043 -.120
Development cooperation .155 .155
Education -.067 -.039
Environment or animals .098 .058
Health care .032 .054
Human rights and
workers’ rights
-.001 .167
International emergency
relief
-.018 -.066
Research -.096 -.099
Religion .201 -.052
Sports .202* .039
Human services/
community improvement
-.114 -.093
Culture or art -.078 -.134
Consumer or citizen interests -.066 -.092
N 84 86
R2 .348 .199
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that a higher degree of volunteer involvement leads to a democratic election of the
board by a general assembly. Our results are not unequivocal and let us partly reject
the hypothesis: The percentage of board members elected by the organization’s
individual members does not correlate significantly with the number volunteers
worldwide or at the headquarters (see Table 10). Nevertheless, stakeholder
representation of volunteers on the board is much higher in INGOs with a high
number of volunteers at the headquarters. The relationship is very strong and very
significant. This is only true for the ratio of volunteers versus paid staff at the
headquarters. We control our findings for the legal form, age, size, and field of
activity.
In sum, our results let us reject parts of hypothesis H1b and H2 while accepting
hypothesis H1a and H1c. Our findings indicate that INGOs which finance
themselves primarily through membership fees from individual members have
boards elected democratically by a general assembly (H1a). We also demonstrate
that INGOs which finance themselves primarily through public donations have self-
selected boards that are nominated to represent the government or public
administrations (H1b). The residual rights of control, i.e., the right to nominate
board members or a seat on the board, of all other donors such as philanthropists and
foundations do not correlate significantly with their degree of importance as
resource provider. Furthermore, we show that INGOs which finance themselves
primarily through contributions from regional member organizations have boards
that are either elected by a general assembly or the regional member organizations
themselves or are nominated to represent them (H1c). Finally, we note that in
INGOs where the degree of volunteer involvement at the headquarters is relatively
high, there are more board members representing volunteers (H2). Nevertheless,
only this element of hypothesis 2 is supported by the data: A higher degree of
volunteer involvement at the global level or at the headquarters does not correlate
Table 8 Number of volunteers
N = 124
a The data for the number of
volunteers ‘worldwide’ include
volunteers active at the
‘headquarters’
Number of volunteers Worldwidea Headquarters
0 46 80
1–10 26 31
11–100 34 9
101–1000 12 4
1001–10,000 4 0
10,001–100,000 2 0
Table 9 Number of paid staff
N = 124
a The data for the number of
paid staff ‘worldwide’ include
paid staff working at the
‘headquarters’
Number of paid staff Worldwidea Headquarters
0 39 44
1–10 52 61
11–100 27 15
101–1000 6 5
1001–10,000 0 0
10,001–100,000 0 0
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with a higher number of board members democratically elected by a general
assembly. Also, a higher degree of volunteer involvement at the global level does
not correlate with more volunteer representation at the board level.
Discussion
Internal governance is a crucial means for INGOs to achieve legitimacy,
accountability, and effectiveness particularly with regard to the challenging and
volatile global environments in which they operate, increased calls for profession-
alization of the sector, and resource scarcity (Anheier and Themudo 2005;
Lindenberg and Dobel 1999). In this context a fundamental question for INGOs is
Table 10 Relationship
between the degree of volunteer
involvement and board
nomination and composition
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05,
*** p \ 0.001 (two-tailed)
Nomination
mode: elected
by individual
members
Stakeholder
representation:
volunteers
Volunteers
Worldwide .006 -.010
Headquarter .171 .341**
Legal form
Foundation -.241* -.017
Association .022 -.066
Age -.242** .137
Size
Revenues .201 -.226
Paid staff -.160 -.046
Field of activity
Business -.007 -.067
Development cooperation -.124 -.076
Education .060 .069
Environment or animals .015 -.030
Health care -.049 .057
Human rights and workers’
rights
.241** .091
International emergency relief .143 -.090
Research -.040 .181
Religion -.276** .073
Sports -.186* .193
Human services/community
improvement
-.049 .047
Culture or art .402*** .137
Consumer or citizen interests -.084 -.050
N 86 88
R2 .481 .236
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how to deal with their extremely broad and heterogeneous set of stakeholders as
indicated by the International Non-Governmental Organisations’ Accountability
Charter (2005). From a resource dependency and stakeholder theory perspective
(Freeman 1984; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the question is which of those
stakeholders constitute primary stakeholders in respect to the needed resources
(Speckbacher 2008), or, in other words, which of those stakeholders are given
residual rights of control: the right to nominate members of the board or to be
represented on the board. In our study, we therefore analyzed whether INGOs
follow the nomination mode of membership organizations, where the board is
elected by the organizational actors and members, or of board-managed organiza-
tions, where the board is appointed by the most influential external stakeholders
(Enjolras 2009).
In sum, we find that the residual rights in INGOs are unequally distributed and
that in INGOs with their headquarters in Switzerland the decision of whether to
follow a membership model or a board-managed model partly depends on the most
important resource providers or, in other words, primary stakeholders:
First, we find that INGOs already integrate public administrations and
governments, hence traditional INGO donors, in addition to their individual and
regional member organizations. However, social investors, e.g., foundations and
philanthropists are often excluded from the board. These resource providers do not
hold significantly more residual rights of control in INGOs which finance
themselves primarily through their contributions. The results thereby indicate that
external resource providers hold a weak bargaining position with respect to INGO
governance. Their residual rights of control are not protected. They do not have the
chance to influence the mission and the strategy of the INGO through board politics,
they do not participate directly in the oversight of the executive director and they do
not represent the organization externally. Our results indicate that only the members
of INGOs, both individual members and regional member organizations, in fact
hold residual rights in the majority of the cases: They occupy an important position
when it comes to the nomination and election of board members and they have more
representatives on the board level. In other words, these INGOs are organized more
democratically as board members are elected by general assemblies and not
nominated by the board itself. In conclusion, if donors other than governments and
individual and regional member organizations become more important for the
funding of the INGO, INGOs need to find ways to integrate them into their board
despite their democratic decision-making processes.
Second, we find that only those INGOs with a strong degree of volunteer
involvement at the headquarters tend to allow volunteers to vote for board members,
for example, through a general assembly. If the volunteers are only represented on
the periphery, even by a high number, they are excluded. Nevertheless, as in the
case of the donors, from a resource dependency theory perspective, these
stakeholders ought to be involved in the organization’s internal governance. One
of the reasons for these results might be the difficulty in leading volunteers
(Kreutzer and Ja¨ger 2011). It seems to be much more convenient for boards to
exclude this group of stakeholders from residual rights of control. Furthermore, it is
likely that not all types of volunteers will evenly ask for residual rights of control. In
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some cases the intrinsic motivation to work towards common goals and to network
with people with similar values and beliefs will be sufficient rewards for volunteers,
even if an INGO excludes them from decision making processes. However, if
volunteers become more important as a resource provider, INGOs also need to find
ways of strengthening their position in the governance of the INGO, for example by
allowing them to vote for board members or by nominating board members
representing volunteers.
These results suggest that INGOs maintain democratic internal governance
mechanisms (membership model) in order to provide internal primary stakeholders
with residual rights of control even if external stakeholders such as donors like
philanthropists, foundations and volunteers provide vital tangible and intangible
resources to the INGOs and therefore legitimately claim residual rights of control,
i.e., by nominating board members (board-managed model).
Overall, this study holds important implications for the governance of CSOs in
general, highlighting the relevance of board nomination modes and by showing how
CSOs can incorporate stakeholders into their governance mechanisms. Due to their
international structure and activity, the multitude and heterogeneity of stakeholders
is particularly strong for INGOs as described in their ‘‘Accountability Charter’’
(2005). However, CSOs face the same challenge to decide which stakeholders
should be regarded as primary stakeholders and be involved in the governance of the
organization.
The critical question for CSOs in general is whether a lack of influence from
external primary stakeholders in the internal governance weakens the overall
legitimacy, accountability and performance. If we assume that a vital function of
boards is to establish links to important stakeholders and to effectively control and
monitor the organization, it is reasonable to argue that it does. These stakeholders
not only provide vital resources and hence have the right to monitor the use of the
resources, they also possess access to important information which is vital for the
board in order to effectively fulfill its tasks. For example, volunteers are in the front
ranks when it comes to the implementation of programs and have direct contact with
the recipients of services of the CSO. In order to ensure sustainable long-term
performance, board members ought to monitor and manage relationships between
the various stakeholders and ensure organizational responsiveness. Key roles of
CSO boards are to represent key stakeholders, to facilitate negotiation, to resolve
potential conflicting interests, and to ensure that management acts in the interest of
these stakeholders.
On the other side, internal democratic governance mechanisms are an important
aspect of self-governance which is a constituting criterion for CSOs (Gordenker and
Weiss 1995; Vakil 1997). From a neo-institutional perspective (DiMaggio and
Anheier 1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1983), we can argue that Swiss INGOs
maintain the membership model because it enjoys high legitimacy in the population
(Helmig et al. 2009; Nollert and Budowski 2009). Neo-institutional theory suggests
that CSOs are susceptible to external legitimacy demands and therefore tend to
rationalize internal structures in order to ensure survival (Scott 2001; Suchman
1995). CSO boards and board nomination modes are one way to communicate
externally the organization’s responsiveness to societal efficiency norms and
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preferences. In our case, the legitimacy of the membership model can be seen as a
resource in itself which is important for CSOs and competes with funding as a
resource when CSOs strategically choose a board nomination system (Abzug and
Galaskiewicz 2001).
Conclusions
Based on the previously introduced results, our study mainly provides practitioners
and researchers with an empirical contribution to the field of the governance of
INGOs and CSOs: First, our study provides a comprehensive profile of the Swiss
INGO sector. To date, only studies on the Swiss civil society sector in general are
available (Helmig et al. 2009; Jakob et al. 2009; Nollert and Budowski 2009) and
there are no specific data on INGOs. Our research reveals how many INGOs are
active in the field, how big and old they are, in which fields they are active and how
their governance is structured.
Second, the study sheds light on the governance of INGOs from a comparative
point of view. Several studies have discussed qualitatively different designs for the
governance of INGOs (Fowler 1997; Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Young 1992),
but very few quantitative studies are available that provide an empirical overview of
the sector and test the hypotheses gained by the qualitative endeavors. Further,
existing studies do not deal with board nomination modes and stakeholder
representation in particular (Andre´s-Alonso et al. 2009; Iecovich 2005a). Our study
shows that board nomination modes and stakeholder representation in INGOs vary,
how they vary, and why they vary.
Third, practitioners in INGOs and CSOs may find it useful to use our theoretical
model when facing the challenge of how to treat different stakeholders. Again, we
believe that it is vitally important and rational for INGOs and CSOs to view
themselves as accountable to a wide range of stakeholders. Nevertheless, we argue
that from a resource dependency perspective these organizations should decide
which stakeholders are treated as primary stakeholders and hence receive the right to
play an important role as actors within the internal governance of the organization.
Our argument is that donors and volunteers are primary stakeholders in an economic
sense as they provide vital and specific resources to the organization, create value for
the organization, and at the same time do not possess completely specified claims on
their return on investment. An INGO or CSO cannot succeed without their support
and therefore they should be granted residual rights of control.
Our study has several important limitations. To further strengthen our results,
longitudinal studies over a longer period of time in a multitude of countries would
be desirable. Our study only provides a snapshot of the Swiss INGO sector and we
are not able to describe trends. Also, the results of such an empirical study could
differ in an Anglo-Saxon country as the models of governance are different there.
Hence, a comparative implementation of our theoretical model in different countries
would significantly strengthen the reliability and validity of our results.
Another limitation is that the study only touches upon board nomination modes
and stakeholder representation and does not analyze the structure and functioning of
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INGO boards in detail. This is where we see promising directions for further
research. Our research could serve as a starting point for further empirical,
quantitative work on different aspects of INGO governance and how the design of
INGO governance depends on different internal and external aspects. Given the
huge variety of different types of INGOs, such comparative studies seem
particularly fruitful. Also, INGOs and CSOs in general are in need of integrated
models of governance which allow them both to install democratic internal
governance mechanisms in which individual members, regional member organiza-
tions, and volunteers can vote for board members and which also allow them to
represent their most important external stakeholders and resource providers on the
board level. Overall, the sector deserves more scientific attention given its
importance within global governance and its level of exposure to public expectation
as well as criticism. After all, INGOs ‘‘make the world far more global than it would
otherwise be’’ (Boli 2006).
Acknowledgments We are grateful for the financial support of this study provided by the Dr.h.c. Emil
Zaugg Fund. We also would like to thank Ariane Westphal, Steven Floyd and two anonymous reviewers
for their useful comments.
References
Abzug, R., & Galaskiewicz, J. (2001). Nonprofit boards: Crucibles of expertise or symbols of local
identities? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(1), 51–73.
Andre´s-Alonso, P. d., Azofra-Palenzuela, V., & Romero-Merino, M. E. (2009). Determinants of nonprofit
board size and composition. The case of Spanish Foundations. Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 38(5), 784–809.
Andre´s-Alonso, P. d., Martı´n-Cruz, N., & Romero-Merino, M. E. (2006). The governance of nonprofit
organizations. Empirical evidence from nongovernmental development organizations in Spain.
Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(4), 588–604.
Anheier, H. K. (2005). Nonprofit organizations, theory, management, policy. London, New York:
Routledge.
Anheier, H. K., & Leat, D. (2006). Creative philanthropy. London, New York: Routledge.
Anheier, H. K., & Themudo, N. (2005). Governance and management of international membership
organizations. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 11(2), 185–198.
Boli, J. (2006). International nongovernmental organizations. In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), The
nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 333–354). New Haven & London: Yale University
Press.
Brown, W. A. (2005). Exploring the association between board and organizational performance in
nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 15(3), 317–339.
Brown, L. D. (2008). Creating credibility, legitimacy and accountability for transnational civil society.
Sterling: Kumarian Press.
Brown, L. D., & Moore, M. H. (2001). Accountability, strategy, and international nongovernmental
organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(3), 569–587.
Cornell, B., & Shapiro, A. C. (1987). Corporate stakeholders and corporate finance. Financial
Management, 16(1), 5–14.
Cornforth, C., & Edwards, C. (1999). Board roles in the strategic management of non-profit organisations:
Theory and practice. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 7(4), 346–362.
Curbach, J. (2003). Global Governance und NGOs. Transnationale Zivilgesellschaft in internationalen
Politiknetzwerken (Global governance and NGOs. Transnational civil society in international
political networks). Opladen: Leske ? Budrich.
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management.
Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47.
Voluntas (2011) 22:587–612 609
123
Dichter, T. W. (1989). Development management: Plain or fancy? Sorting out some muddles. Public
Administration & Development, 9(4), 381–393.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Anheier, H. K. (1990). The sociology of nonprofit organizations and sectors. Annual
Review of Sociology, 16(1), 137–159.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160.
Edmondson, A. C., & McManus, S. E. (2007). Methodological fit in management field research. Academy
of Management Review, 32(4), 1155–1179.
Enjolras, B. (2009). A governance-structure approach to voluntary organizations. Nonprofit & Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 38(5), 761–783.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics,
26(2), 301–326.
Fisher, J. (2003). Nongovernments. NGOs and the political development of the Third World. Jaipur and
New Delhi: Rawat Publications.
Foreman, K. (1999). Evolving global structures and the challenges facing international relief and
development organizations. Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(4), 178–197.
Fowler, A. (1997). Striking a balance. A guide to enhancing the effectiveness of non-governmental
organisations in international development. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management. A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman.
Gibelman, M., & Gelman, S. R. (2004). A loss of credibility: Patterns of wrongdoing among
nongovernmental organizations. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations, 15(4), 355–381.
Glaeser, E. L. (2003). The governance of not-for-profit firms. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gordenker, L., & Weiss, T. G. (1995). Pluralising global governance: Analytical approaches and
dimensions. Third World Quarterly, 16(3), 358–387.
Helmig, B., Ba¨rlocher, C., & Schnurbein, G. v. (2009). Defining the nonprofit sector: Switzerland.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. (2000). Board practices of especially effective and less effective local
nonprofit organizations. American Review of Public Administration, 30(2), 146–160.
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. Journal of
Management, 35(6), 1404–1427.
Hudson, B. A., & Bielefeld, W. (1997). Structures of multinational nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit
Management & Leadership, 8(1), 31–49.
Hung, H. (1998). A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 6(2), 101–111.
Iecovich, E. (2005a). Environmental and organizational features and their impact on structural and
functional characteristics of boards in nonprofit organizations. Administration in Social Work, 29(3),
43–59.
Iecovich, E. (2005b). The profile of board membership in Israeli voluntary organizations. Voluntas:
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 16(2), 161–180.
International Non-Governmental Organisations. (2005). INGO accountability charter. Retrieved
August 29, 2011, from http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/
INGO-Accountability-Charter_logo1.pdf.
Ja¨ger, U., Kreutzer, K., & Beyes, T. (2008). Balancing acts: NPO leadership and volunteering. Financial
Accountability & Management, 25(1), 557–575.
Jakob, D., Huber, R., & Rauber, K. (2009). Nonprofit law in Switzerland. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
Center for Civil Society Studies.
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. Advocacy networks in international politics.
Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
Kreutzer, K. (2009). Nonprofit governance during organizational transition in voluntary associations.
Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 1(20), 117–133.
Kreutzer, K., & Ja¨ger, U. (2011). Volunteering versus managerialism: Conflict over organizational
identity in voluntary associations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(4), 634–661.
Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. G. (Eds.). (1995). New social movements in
Western Europe. A comparative analysis. London: UCL Press.
Lee, T. (2010). The rise of international nongovernmental organizations: A top-down or bottom-up
explanation? Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 21(3),
393–416.
610 Voluntas (2011) 22:587–612
123
Lewis, D. (1998). Bridiging the Gap? The Parallel Universes of the Non-profit and Non-governmental
Organisation Research Traditions and the Changing Context of Voluntary Action. CVO
International Working Paper 1. London: London School of Economics.
Lewis, D. (2006). The management of non-governmental development organizations (2nd ed.). London:
Routledge.
Lindenberg, M., & Bryant, C. (2001). Going global. Transforming relief and development NGOs.
Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
Lindenberg, M., & Dobel, J. P. (1999). The challenges of globalization for northern international relief
and development NGOs. Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(1), 4–24.
Lloyd, R., Warren, S., & Hammer, M. (2008). Global accountability report 2008. London: One World
Trust.
Martens, K. (2002). Mission impossible? Defining nongovernmental organizations. Voluntas: Interna-
tional Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 13(3), 271–285.
Miller-Millesen, J. L. (2003). Understanding the behavior of nonprofit boards of directors: A theory-based
approach. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(4), 521–547.
Muth, M. M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship theory and bard structure: A contingency approach.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6(1), 5–28.
Nollert, M., & Budowski, M. (2009). Government policy and the nonprofit sector: Switzerland (Vol. 48).
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
Ossewaarde, R., Nijho, A., & Heyse, L. (2008). Dynamics of NGO legitimacy: How organising betrays
core missions of INGOs. Public Administration and Development, 28(1), 42–53.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence
perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Provan, K. G. (1980). Board Power and Organizational Effectiveness among Human Service Agencies.
Academy of Management Journal, 23(2), 221–236.
Robinson, F., & Shaw, K. (2003). Who governs Northeast England? A regional perspective on
governance. In C. Cornforth (Ed.), The governance of public and non-profit organizations. London:
Routledge.
Salamon, L. M. (1997a). The international guide to nonprofit law. New York: John Wiley.
Salamon, L. M. (1997b). The rise of the non-profit sector. Foreign Affairs, 73(4), 109–122.
Salamon, L. M. (2003). The resilient sector: The state of nonprofit America. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press.
Salm, J. (1999). Coping with globalization: A profile of the northern NGO sector. Nonprofit & Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 28(1), 87–103.
Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Siciliano, J. I. (1996). The relationship of board member diversity to organizational performance. Journal
of Business Ethics, 15(12), 1313–1320.
Siciliano, J. I. (1997). The relationship between formal planning and performance in nonprofit
organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 7(4), 387–403.
Siebart, P., & Reichard, C. (2004). Corporate governance of nonprofit-organizations. In A. Zimmer, et al.
(Eds.), Future of civil society. Making Central European Nonprofit-Organizations Work (pp.
271–296). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
Smith, J., & Wiest, D. (2005). The uneven geography of global civil society: National and global
influences on transnational association. Social Forces, 84(2), 622–652.
Speckbacher, G. (2008). Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approach. Nonprofit
Management and Leadership, 18(3), 295–320.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of
Management Review, 20(3), 571–610.
Teegen, H., Doh, J. P., & Vachani, S. (2004). The importance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
in global governance and value creation: An international business research agenda. Journal of
International Business Studies, 35(6), 463–483.
The Swiss NPO Code. (2006). Corporate governance guidelines for non-profit organisations in
Switzerland.
UIA. (2010). Yearbook of international organizations: Guide to global and civil society networks (Vol. 5:
Statistics, visualizations and patterns). Munich: Saur.
Vakil, A. C. (1997). Confronting the classification problem: Toward a taxonomy of NGOs. World
Development, 25(12), 2057–2070.
Voluntas (2011) 22:587–612 611
123
Weidenbaum, M. (2009). Who will guard the guardians? The social responsibility of NGOs. Journal of
Business Ethics, 87(1), 147–155.
Willets, P. (2010). The growth in the number of NGOs in consultative status with the economic and social
council of the United Nations. Retrieved December 12, 2010, from http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/
p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-GRPH.HTM#book.
Young, D. R. (1992). Organising principles for international advocacy associations. Voluntas:
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 3(1), 1–28.
Young, D. R. (2001a). Organizational identity and the structure of nonprofit umbrella associations.
Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 11(3), 289–304.
Young, D. R. (2001b). Organizational identity in nonprofit organizations: Strategic and structural
implications. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 12(2), 139–157.
Young, D. R., Koenig, B. L., Najam, A., & Fisher, J. (1999). Strategy and structure in managing global
associations. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 10(4),
323–343.
612 Voluntas (2011) 22:587–612
123
